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Older workers who lose their job are at great risk of experiencing long-term 
unemployment. This vulnerability can be due to negative selection into 
unemployment or to age discrimination by employers. We empirically test three 
explanations of why older jobseekers may struggle to get reemployed: employers 
promote internal careers; employers prefer younger workers for physically 
demanding jobs; employers perceive older workers as being too expensive. We 
answer this question by analysing two experiments in Switzerland. In a factorial 
survey experiment, 500 recruiters indicated for fictional CVs with ages 35 to 55 the 
likelihood of an invitation to a job interview. In a natural experiment, 1200 workers 
were surveyed two years after their plant closed down, allowing us to compare age 
gaps in reemployment among workers displaced by the same exogenous event. 
Combining the two experimental methods allows us to increase internal and external 
validity. Both the factorial survey among recruiters and the survey among displaced 
workers show large age barriers in hiring. Unemployed workers aged 55 are much 
less likely to be considered for hiring than those aged 35 with the same productive 
attributes. This age penalty is larger for blue-collar workers and clerks than upper-
level white-collar employees, throwing doubt on the internal career hypothesis. By 
contrast, results for earnings are consistent with the argument that older workers’ 
reemployment chances are hampered by high wage costs. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, governments across Europe have increased the statutory retirement 
age. Postponing the pension age means that older workers depend on labour market income 
for longer periods of their lives. These policy changes take place against a background where 
older jobseekers struggle to find reemployment and face much longer unemployment spells 
than younger jobseekers in both Europe (European Commission 2012: 9) and the US (Farber 
et al. 2017: 169). Such age-related barriers in hiring seem at odds with government 
exhortations to work longer. 
At the same time, the unemployment rates of older workers lie systematically below those 
of younger age groups across the OECD. Unemployment among older workers is then defined 
less by the risk of becoming unemployed than by the vulnerability of remaining unemployed 
for long periods of time (Hornstein and Lubik 2015: 135). Unemployment may thus have a 
heterogeneous effect on age groups, leaving deeper scars on older than mid-aged and young 
individuals (Gangl 2006).   
In recent years, the issue of causal heterogeneity has attracted growing interest among 
social stratification researchers (e. g. Brand and Xie 2010, Xie et al. 2012). The idea is that 
the same treatment (say, unemployment) affects different population groups (say, age cohorts) 
in different ways. At the same time, effects that are actually homogeneous (and thus do not 
differ between age groups) may easily be mistaken as being heterogeneous if unobserved 
selection has an influence on both the treatment (such as losing one’s job) and outcome (such 
as getting reemployed) (Breen et al. 2015).  
This argument is relevant because unobserved selection into unemployment is likely to be 
stronger among older than younger workers. When young workers enter the labour market, 
they typically experience periods of unemployment and job-hopping before finding a good 
employer match. Since most new jobs are unstable and of short duration, spells of 
unemployment are more common at earlier than later stages of the work career (Farber 1999: 
16, Hornstein and Lubik 2015: 135). The fewer old workers who become unemployed may 
thus be selected more negatively. This argument would thus explain older jobseekers’ 
reemployment difficulties by their (unobserved) work-related characteristics rather than by 
their age. 
Yet there are also good reasons to expect a truly heterogeneous effect of age on 
reemployment. This is the case if employers hold age-related stereotypes and avoid hiring 
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older workers because they consider them to be less resistant to stress, less competent in new 
technologies, to make higher wage demands or to be less productive overall than younger 
workers (Karpinska et al. 2013).  
Our paper analyses the extent and causes of age barriers in hiring – discrimination against 
older jobseekers – on the basis of two experiments. We first turn to a factorial survey 
experiment (also known as vignette study) where 500 HR professionals indicate the likelihood 
that they would invite fictional jobseekers to a job interview. By randomly varying a set of 
dimensions in the résumés, we are able to see whether unemployed workers aged 50 or 55 are 
less likely to get a job interview than their colleagues aged 35 or 40. Second, we use mass 
displacement as a natural experiment and surveyed 1200 workers two years after their plant 
closed down. This survey allows us to compare age differences in reemployment rates among 
jobseekers who were made redundant by the same exogenous event. 
The two experiments complement each other. The factorial survey informs us of the 
demand-side of the labour market – employers and their ratings – and has strong internal 
validity. Yet although we targeted actual recruiters rather than undergraduate students or 
random individuals, the factorial survey only captures hiring intentions in a hypothetical 
setting. For this reason, we combine the vignette study with a mass displacement survey, 
which focuses on the supply-side of the labour market – jobseekers and their reemployment 
chances – and reflects real-life behaviour, thus providing us with stronger external validity.  
All our data for the vignette study and mass displacement survey were collected in 
Switzerland. Evidence from the United States (Farber et al. 2017) and the Netherlands 
(Karpinska et al. 2011) suggests that employers discriminate less against older workers when 
the labour market is tight. The Swiss labour market has been marked by labour shortage over 
much of the last decades, as is illustrated by low unemployment rates and large inflows of 
work migrants (Murphy and Oesch 2018). If labour shortage makes discrimination costly 
(Baert et al. 2018), it should be particularly hard to find evidence for discrimination in 
Switzerland. 
Our study is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical hypotheses of why 
employers may shy away from hiring older jobseekers. Section 3 provides a review of 
findings on age discrimination in field, laboratory and natural experiments. Sections 4 and 5 
present our factorial survey experiment, the mass displacement survey and discusses the 
institutional context. Section 6 shows the results, revealing in both datasets a large gap in 
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employment probabilities between young and older jobseekers. Section 7 summarizes our 
findings and discusses their policy implications. 
 
2. Why would employers discriminate against older workers? 
The literature on age discrimination highlights the paradox that while most employers have 
older workers under employment, they refrain from newly hiring older workers. 
Schematically, three sets of reasons may account for employers’ reluctance to recruit older 
jobseekers.  
First and foremost are worries about job performance and the widespread expectation that 
older workers are less productive because of lower physical strength, health issues, outdated 
IT-skills, a lack of fluency in foreign languages or little motivation for further education 
(Homrighausen and Wolf 2018: 3). These beliefs about the characteristics of individuals in 
different age groups are widely shared across Western Europe (Radl 2012) and thus represent 
powerful age stereotypes (Rosen and Jerdee 1976: 180).  Another question is whether they 
also amount to discrimination, defined as a situation where jobseekers with the same 
productive abilities are treated differently based on their non-productive characteristics 
(Büsch et al. 2009: 41). This depends on whether age is systematically linked to productivity, 
making workers in their mid-fifties less productive than workers in their mid-thirties. 
Overall, the literature suggests that age is a weak indicator of a jobseeker’s mental and 
physical abilities and thus a poor predictor of his or her work performance. A large meta-
analysis reports a null relationship between age and ten core dimensions of job performance 
(Ng and Feldman 2008: 403). Similarly, a review of over 100 studies concludes that there is 
no significant difference in work productivity between older and younger employees (Warr 
1995: 309). Variance in work productivity is likely to be much larger within an age category 
than between age categories. Nonetheless, an overview article argues that worker productivity 
increases during the initial years in the labour market before stabilizing and often declining 
towards the end of the working life. This decline concerns job tasks where speed and 
endurance are important, but not tasks where experience and verbal abilities matter more 
(Skirbekk 2008: 4).  
If employers’ reluctance to hire older workers is motivated by doubts about their physical 
performance, the age penalty should be stronger in occupations requiring speed and endurance 
than in occupations demanding long experience and specialized expertise. Blue-collar workers 
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such as assemblers and building caretakers stand for the former, high-level managers and 
professionals for the latter, the best example being legislators whose name “senator” (from 
Latin senex meaning “old”) suggests a job reserved for elder citizens. This leads us to 
formulate a first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: If employers expect older workers to underperform in tasks requiring speed 
and endurance, the age barrier in hiring should be larger in blue-collar occupations than in 
occupations held by professionals and managers, with office clerks in an intermediate 
position. 
 
Second, the hiring of older workers may contradict the logic of long-term employment 
relationships where firms motivate younger workers to stay on with a deferred compensation 
scheme based on seniority. In this setting, the recruitment of older candidates interferes with 
implicit promises made to younger employees because it runs contrary to the policy of 
primarily promoting internal careers (Daniel and Heywood 2007: 36-7). Related to this 
argument is the idea that investing in the training of new workers may not be profitable if 
these workers have only a few more years to go until retirement. 
This argument has clear implications for how the age penalty should vary across 
occupations. If employers restrain from hiring older workers because their organization uses 
long-term incentive schemes and promotes internal careers, the age barrier should be higher 
for managers and professionals than office clerks and blue-collar workers who rarely benefit 
from internal labour markets. Likewise, investing in the training of managers and 
professionals should be more costly than preparing an office clerk or a blue-collar worker for 
his or her new job. This leads to our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: If the age barrier is caused by employers’ concern about internal careers, 
the age penalty should be larger for managers and professionals than office clerks and blue-
collar workers who largely operate outside of internal labour markets.  
 
Third, older jobseekers may face difficulties to find a new job because they are expected to 
be too costly in terms of wages. The idea is that older workers possess valuable experience 
and expertise, but these skills come to a large extent with increased firm-tenure and cannot be 
transferred easily to another organization. When made redundant, older workers may 
therefore lose their firm-specific productivity advantage relative to younger workers. To the 
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extent that prospective employers expect older workers to demand wages similar to those 
earned before redundancy, older jobseekers may not be hired because their wages exceed their 
productivity (Lassus et al. 2015: 85). Expressed differently, this hypothesis implies that if 
displaced older workers are no more productive than younger workers, but their wages were 
higher, older jobseekers will only get reemployed if they accept to earn substantially less. This 
expectation is spelled out in our third hypothesis.    
Hypothesis 3: If the age barrier in hiring is due to employers’ expectation that older 
workers cost too much relative to their productivity, employers will not hire older jobseekers 
unless these latter put up with large wage cuts. 
 
3. Earlier evidence on age discrimination in hiring 
Observational studies based on regressions typically find that older jobseekers face higher 
entry barriers to the labour market than younger jobseekers (e.g. Hirsch et al. 2000). However, 
unemployment spells are less frequent among older than younger workers and thus concern a 
smaller and possibly more negatively selected group. This has led social scientists to 
increasingly challenge the conclusions of labour market discrimination based on non-
experimental research (see Neumark 2018: 800). If older workers with health problems are 
made redundant, their struggle to become reemployed may be due to unobserved 
characteristics (such as failing health) and not employers’ preference for younger workers per 
se. This growing awareness of unobserved heterogeneity has turned experiments into the gold 
standard in research on hiring discrimination, notably field experiments, laboratory 
experiments and natural experiments. 
Field experiments on age discrimination mainly consist of correspondence studies where 
researchers send applications of fictitious jobseekers to real employers. These jobseekers are 
identical in all productivity-related features and solely vary in their age. Two review articles 
on correspondence testing find that age discrimination exists in basically all the countries 
studied and is sizeable. Notably, age discrimination in call-back rates appears to be larger than 
discrimination based on ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation (Baert et al. 2016: 89; 
Neumark 2018). In correspondence studies for Britain, France, Germany and Spain, call-back 
rates are consistently lower for older than younger waiters (Riach 2015). Likewise, Farber and 
colleagues (2017: 172) show for the United States that unemployed office clerks in their 
fifties are significantly less likely to be called back than those in their thirties and early forties. 
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While there is no difference in the call-back rates for applicants aged 35-37 and 40-42, the 
call-back rate drops markedly for ages 55 to 58 (Farber et al. 2017: 180). 
Most correspondence studies use large entry-level occupations such as sales assistants or 
waiters, with office clerks as a common alternative (see the overview by Baert et al. 2016: 
89). The literature finds substantial age barriers for all these jobs and throws doubt on the 
argument that age discrimination is solely due to internal labour markets: Most waiters and 
sales assistants do not evolve in internal labour markets (see Riach 2015, Farber et al. 2017). 
Likewise, age discrimination does not seem to be restricted to occupations with direct 
customer contact (Lahey 2008) and does not vary much between administrative assistants, 
vendors, security guards or building caretakers (Neumark et al. 2015: 45). At the same time, 
none of these studies explicitly tests differences in age discrimination between occupations.  
The most common laboratory experiment uses vignette studies. One of the earliest vignette 
studies on age discrimination surveyed 50 students and 56 real estate agents in the US and 
found that 60-year old workers were rated systematically lower on performance capacity than 
30-year old workers (Rosen and Jerdee 1976). In a replication study, Weiss and Maurer (2004) 
found little evidence of age discrimination for a sample of 204 undergraduate students in the 
United States. By contrast, Büsch and colleagues (2009) find age discrimination in hiring for 
a student sample and a small group of personnel managers in Germany, but not in Norway. In 
the Netherlands, several factorial survey experiments analyse the circumstances in which 
retired jobseekers are re-hired (Karpinska et al. 2011, Mulders et al. 2014) or older workers 
are kept on rather than offered early retirement (Henkens et al. 2009, Karpinska et al. 2013). 
These studies conclude that, regardless their skill level, workers who have reached the 
retirement age are unlikely to be kept on or newly hired – except in tight job markets. When 
labour shortage looms large, the chances of older workers improve.  
While basically all the published correspondence studies find age discrimination (Neumark 
2018), this is not the case for vignette studies. This discrepancy may be due either to a 
publication bias against null results in correspondence studies or to socially desirable answers 
in vignette studies. The likelihood of respondents giving socially desirable answers and 
denying any form of age discrimination is high if vignette studies manipulate only one single 
dimension, namely age – as is the case in Rosen and Jerdee (1976), Weiss and Maurer (2004) 
or Büsch et al. (2009).  
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A final set of studies uses plant closure as a natural experiment. The idea is that plant 
closure represents an exogenous source of variation where all workers lose their jobs 
irrespective of their individual performance and productive characteristics. These studies 
typically find that displaced older workers face the choice between reemployment with large 
earnings losses, involuntary early retirement or long periods of unemployment – be it in 
Finland (Jolkkonen et al. 2012), Germany (Knuth and Kalina 2002), Switzerland (Baumann 
2016) or the USA (Chan and Stevens 2001). The same result is shown by a panel analysis for 
Germany that compares displaced and non-displaced older workers over time based on a 
matching technique (Heisig and Radl 2017).  
In all these countries, the age barrier in reemployment is substantial. As a case in point, the 
analysis of the American Displaced Workers Survey 1994-2016 shows a larger reemployment 
gap after job loss between mid-aged (35-44) and older workers (55-64) than between workers 
with a college degree and workers having no more than high-school education. The age gap is 
16 percentage points as compared to 12.5 points for the education gap, suggesting that an 
older age is a greater handicap for reemployment in the United States than low levels of 
education (Farber 2017: 249).   
 
4. Data and methods 
4.1 Factorial Survey Experiment  
Our analysis first examines the extent of and reasons behind age discrimination with a 
factorial survey experiment. By combining the logic of an experiment with that of a social 
survey, factorial surveys present four attractive features (Wallander 2009, Auspurg and Hinz 
2015, McDonald 2019). First, they enable the researcher to create the résumés of fictitious job 
candidates (vignettes) who have the same productive characteristics and simply differ in terms 
of age (or gender or nationality).  Second, the random assignment of vignettes to respondents 
allows the researcher to fully control the information shown to respondents and thus excludes 
unobserved characteristics (such as a jobseeker’s motivation) that affect the outcome variable 
(such as hiring). Third, jobseekers’ attributes such as age, gender, nationality or education 
vary randomly in each vignette. These ever-changing combinations make it hard for 
respondents to pick out the central dimension of interest, thus reducing the social desirability 
bias. This point has been forcefully shown by Auspurg and colleagues (2017) for the gender 
wage gap in Germany: In their factorial survey, respondents indicated systematically higher 
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wages for male than female profiles. Finally, factorial surveys raise fewer ethical concerns 
than correspondence studies, where employers are intentionally misled by fictitious 
applications, with possibly disruptive consequences for recruitment and the running of 
businesses.  
As a drawback, factorial surveys present hypothetical scenarios that may be seen as 
unrealistic and elicit little respondent engagement. Moreover, the ratings of vignettes only 
reflect the stated intentions of respondents, which may differ from their effective actions 
(Pager and Quillian 2005). The degree to which stated intentions can be generalized to the 
recruitment process is further limited if these intentions are collected among undergraduate 
students or the general population.  
Our factorial survey tries to address this last issue by targeting real recruiters. In 2016, we 
sent a web-based questionnaire to around 4000 HR managers in Switzerland and obtained 
responses from 537 individuals, a response rate of around 13 percent.1 93 percent of all 
respondents had been actively involved in at least one recruitment over the last 12 months, the 
median number of recruitments being ten. Our analytical sample only includes these active 
recruiters. They are, on average, 46 years old and in their majority women (63 per cent 
female), disproportionately work in large organizations and mostly answered the survey in 
German (70 per cent against 30 percent in French).  
Our factorial survey experiment was presented as a study of hiring practices in different 
industries and regions for three occupations: expert accountant, human resources assistant and 
building caretaker. These three occupations are common in many organizations and represent 
three hierarchical levels in terms of skill requirements: a high-skilled professional occupation 
(ISCO major group 2), a mid-skilled clerical occupation (ISCO 4) and a low-skilled blue-
collar occupation (ISCO 9). This allows us to test our hypotheses which expect age 
discrimination to vary across occupations. 
Recruiters were asked to indicate for 12 vignettes (4 per occupation) first the likelihood 
that they would invite a candidate to a job interview (on a scale from 0 to 10) and second the 
monthly wage that seemed adequate for a given candidate, regardless of the likelihood of a 
job interview. All candidates were presented as being unemployed because their company has 
closed down. The order in which vignettes were presented was randomized. Taking out non-
responses and using only active recruiters, we are left with 501 recruiters who provide us with 
their ratings for 5290 candidates. These 5290 ratings constitute our analytical sample.  
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The profiles of our job candidates – the vignettes – are made up of 11 dimensions, 
including age, gender, nationality and the type of education. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the 
appendix present all the vignette dimensions and levels and show an example of the vignettes. 
A thorny issue in experimental studies of age discrimination is the amount of work experience 
that different candidates should have. Our factorial survey mentions for all candidates that 
they have eight years of work experience in the occupation for which they applied. Thanks to 
randomization, all the vignette dimensions such as age, gender, or nationality are uncorrelated 
to each other (see table A.3 in the appendix for the correlation matrix). 2   
 
4.2 Mass displacement survey  
Due to their experimental design, factorial surveys have high internal validity. However, the 
extent to which findings can be generalized to other contexts is less certain. For this reason, 
we use a second dataset of displaced workers who were surveyed about two years after their 
plant had closed down. This setting comes close to a natural experiment (Brand 2015: 361). 
Plant closure does not completely solve the issue of selection if the most dynamic workers 
decipher the writing on the wall and leave the failing firm before it goes bankrupt. Moreover, 
plant closure is more likely to take place in firms and sectors where technology is obsolete, 
innovation weak and the workforce disproportionately composed of older workers, as the lack 
of economic dynamism reduces the hiring rate (Schwerdt 2011). However, since all workers 
are dismissed independently of job performance, plant closure reduces the selection bias 
which arises when firms lay off only their least productive workers.  
Our survey covers the workforces of large manufacturing plants that employed no less than 
150 employees and that closed down in Switzerland in either 2009 or 2010.3 Out of a total of 
ten plants, we succeeded in getting access to the addresses of the workforce of five plants. In 
2011, we sent a questionnaire to all the valid addresses – 90 per cent of the workforce of the 
five plants – which left us with 1203 displaced workers, both high- and low-tenured ones. 748 
individuals responded to the mixed-mode survey (77 percent on paper, 21 on internet and 2 by 
phone), providing a net response rate of 62 per cent (Oesch and Baumann 2015, Baumann 
2016). For both respondents and non-respondents, the survey data was combined, where 
possible, with information from the unemployment insurance register (n=357) and the firms’ 
administrative data (n=600). The combined dataset provides us with some information on the 
post-displacement employment status for 887 individuals and with complete wage 
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information on the pre- and post-unemployment job for 387 individuals. The number of 
observations partly drops because the unemployed and retired cannot declare any post-
unemployment wages. Table A.4 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics of our 
analytical sample. 
 
4.3 Estimation method 
Factorial survey experiment 
Our dependent variable is the likelihood that a jobseeker is invited to an interview (from 0 to 
10) and, in a second step, the wage recommendation. Our key independent variable is age, 
with a fifth each of our fictitious job candidates being attributed 35, 40, 45, 50 and 55 years. 
Since job candidates applied for three different occupations, occupation and the interaction 
between occupation and age are the two central control variables. While we also control for 
gender, nationality, the type of education and type of work experience, the experimental set-
up means that these variables are all uncorrelated and do not alter the results.  
Our factorial survey has a nested data structure as the same respondent rates up to 12 
vignettes. Respondents have different baselines and are likely to compare (and to anchor) the 
ratings given to successive vignettes with the rating given to the first vignette. We thus 
estimate a respondent fixed-effects regression that eliminates differences in respondents’ 
individual baselines and only takes into account the within-respondent variance (that is, the 
differences in a respondent’s ratings of the vignettes shown to him or her). We further correct 
for the clustering of observations within respondents by using clustered standard errors. 
 
Mass displacement survey 
Our dependent variable is the employment status at the moment of the survey, 1.5 to 2.5 years 
after displacement and, in a second step, the change in wages between the pre- and post-
unemployment job. For the employment status, we distinguish four outcomes: employed, 
unemployed, inactive and (early) retired. Our key independent variable is age. We exclude 
respondents who are younger than 23 (and may be apprentices and often return to formal 
education) and older than 62 who have only one (women) or two more years before reaching 
the legal retirement age. Respondents aged 23 to 62 are regrouped into 5-year categories 
centred around half decades of age: 25 (23-27), 30 (28-32), 35 (33-37) up to 60 (58-62).  
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We then estimate multinomial logistic regressions on the employment status. Results are 
shown as the age contrast in being unemployed rather than employed, based on predictive 
margins. We make sure that age cohorts are comparable by controlling for gender, a proxy for 
nationality (four categories), education (six levels) and occupations (nine ISCO groups).  
Finally, we examine differences in age discrimination across occupations by distinguishing 
three occupational groups that correspond to three hierarchical levels of skill requirements: (i) 
upper-level white-collar employees are high-skilled and include occupations such as 
managers, professionals and associate professionals (ISCO major groups 1 to 3); (ii) office 
clerks are mid-skilled and mainly made up by administrative assistants and secretaries (ISCO 
group 4); (iii) blue-collar workers are low-skilled and include occupations such as craft and 
production workers as well as elementary occupations (ISCO groups 7 to 9).  
At first glance, this occupational variable may seem an overly coarse measure. However, 
note that our survey covers the homogeneous workforces of five industrial production plants. 
This means that we deal with the small variety of occupations that exist in manufacturing sites 
where the contrast between upper-level white-collar employees, clerks in the back office and 
rank-and-file workers in production is highly salient (and typically enshrined in collective 
agreements). An added benefit of this threefold distinction is that it makes the occupational 
groups of our two surveys comparable: expert-accountants are upper-level white collar 
employees, HR assistants are office clerks and building caretakers are blue-collar workers.  
 
5. The institutional context of Switzerland 
Our study is set in Switzerland, a country traditionally marked by a tight labour market with 
low unemployment rates and high levels of immigration. Switzerland is comparable to 
Germany in terms of its occupational labour market and the strong links between firm-based 
vocational education and employment. However, employment protection is weaker, coverage 
with collective bargaining lower and there is no legal minimum wage. 
Likewise, age discrimination is not explicitly banned by law as in the United States (with 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act) or the European Union (with the Employment 
Equality Framework Directive). Although the Swiss constitution stipulates that “no person 
may be discriminated against, in particular on grounds of origin, race, gender, age”, the 
federal government has so far refused to introduce an anti-discrimination law that would 
address the employment relationship (Sonnet et al. 2014: 333). 
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Older workers in Switzerland depend on the labour market for their livelihood until their 
sixties. While the legal retirement age is lower than in other European countries (64 for 
women and 65 for men), the welfare state offers few financial incentives to retire early. 
Combined with a dynamic labour market, this leads to one of the highest employment rates 
among individuals aged 55-64 in the OECD: 72 per cent in Switzerland as compared to 57 per 
cent for the European Union and 63 per cent for the United States in 2018.4  
However, the nexus between low risks of becoming unemployed and high risks of 
remaining unemployed is also observable for older workers in Switzerland. Figure 1 shows 
that the likelihood of having experienced a spell of unemployment over the last 12 months is 
much higher for young workers in their twenties and early thirties than workers in their forties 
and, above all, fifties. While this risk exceeds 6 per cent for workers under 25, it is below 2 
per cent for workers aged 55 and more. Yet if older workers do lose their job, they face much 
longer unemployment duration than young jobseekers. While the mean unemployment spell 
among workers aged 20 to 29 lasts less than 160 days, it exceeds 210 days among workers 
aged 50 to 59.  
 
6. Results 
6.1 Invitation to a job interview in the factorial survey experiment 
We first analyse our vignette study and present the likelihood that unemployed workers of 
different ages get invited to a job interview (see Table 1). Model 1 simply regresses age on the 
likelihood of getting a job interview and shows that candidates aged 40 and 45 are no less 
likely to get an invitation than the reference category of candidates aged 35 years. However, 
there is an age penalty for jobseekers aged 50 and, above all, 55. Candidates who are 50 and 
55 years old receive ratings that are 0.14 and 0.55 points lower than candidates aged 35 (for a 
constant of 7.0 points). 
Model 2 includes occupations as a control variable. While the size of the age penalty 
remains unchanged, this model shows that applications for the job of building caretaker were 
rated more favourably than those for the job of accountant and, above all, HR assistant. The 
age coefficients change in model 3 when we additionally introduce an interaction between age 
and occupation. For the reference category of caretakers, the likelihood of being invited to a 
job interview drops heavily already at the age of 50. In contrast, accountants do not yet 
experience any age penalty when turning 50.  
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Figure 1: unemployment incidence and unemployment duration by age in Switzerland 
 
 
Data for unemployment incidence: Swiss sample from European Social Survey, rounds 1 to 8 (2002-16). 
Data for unemployment duration: Swiss unemployment register LAMDA, 2004-12 (see Korber and Oesch 2016) 
 
Model 4 introduces a set of socio-demographic controls. These variables do not change the 
age effect, but allow us to compare the effect size for age discrimination with that for 
discrimination based on nationality. Being 50 (55) years old decreases the likelihood for a 
caretaker to be invited to a job interview by 0.35 (0.54) points – and thus exceeds, in terms of 
disadvantage, the ethnic penalty that candidates of Polish and Turkish origin face relative to 
native Swiss candidates (0.19 or 0.28 points respectively). While it does not help to have a 
Polish or Turkish name when applying for a job in Switzerland, it is even less advantageous to 
be over 50 years old. 
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Table 1: the likelihood to get invited to a job interview depending on a candidate’s age 
(respondent fixed-effects regression on a scale from 0 to 10) 
Dimension Level (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
Age 40 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
(ref: 35 years)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) 
 45 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13) 
 50 -0.14* -0.15* -0.34*** -0.36*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) 
 55 -0.55*** -0.57*** -0.54*** -0.54*** 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) 
Occupation Accountant  -0.21** -0.33** -0.35** 
(ref: caretaker)   (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) 
 HR assistant  -1.10*** -1.04*** -1.04*** 
   (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) 
Age#Occupation 40#accountant   0.09 0.10 
(ref: 35#caretaker)    (0.19) (0.18) 
 40#HRassist   -0.13 -0.12 
    (0.17) (0.17) 
 45#accountant   0.01 0.02 
    (0.18) (0.18) 
 45#HRassist   -0.14 -0.15 
    (0.18) (0.18) 
 50#accountant   0.34* 0.36* 
    (0.19) (0.19) 
 50#HRassist   0.24 0.25 
    (0.18) (0.18) 
 55#accountant   0.18 0.19 
    (0.18) (0.18) 
 55#HRassist   -0.26 -0.25 
    (0.19) (0.18) 
Nationality Spanish    -0.04 
(ref: Swiss)     (0.06) 
 Polish    -0.19*** 
     (0.06) 
 Turkish    -0.28*** 
     (0.07) 
 Constant 7.00*** 7.45*** 7.47*** 7.54*** 
  (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) 
Additional controls  No No No Yes 
 N vignettes 5,290 5,290 5,290 5,290 
 N respondents   501 501 501 501 
 R2 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Additional controls include gender, type 
of education, civil status and type of experience. 
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We provide a clearer picture of the age effect in each occupation by showing the results 
from model 3 as predictive margins in figure 2. It shows that jobseekers aged 40 or 45 are not 
rated any differently than those aged 35 in any occupation. At age 50, there is a hiring penalty 
for building caretakers, but not for HR assistants or accountants. However, at age 55, 
applications for all three occupations receive significantly lower ratings than at the reference 
age of 35. The age penalty at 55 is largest for the HR assistant (-0.80 points) and smallest for 
the accountant (-0.36 points).  
Finally, we provide a formal test of whether human resources professionals perceive age 
differently for the three occupations by contrasting the predictive margins by age and 
occupation (see Figure A.1 in the appendix). This analysis shows that the age penalty of being 
55 rather than 35 is significantly larger among HR assistants than accountants, but does not 
vary systematically between HR assistants and caretakers.       
 
Figure 2: The likelihood to get invited to a job interview by age – relative to candidates aged 
35 (predictive margins on a scale from 0 to 10) 
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The graph shows the predictive margins and 95% confidence intervals of a respondent fixed-effects regression 
on the likelihood to get invited for a job interview (based on model 3 in Table 1)  
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6.2 Reemployment rates in the mass displacement survey 
We turn to the mass displacement survey and show in figure 3 how the employment status of 
displaced workers varies by age two years after plant closure. It is at the age of 35 that the 
unemployment rate is lowest (5 per cent) and the employment rate highest (92 per cent). 
Between the ages of 40 to 50, the unemployment rate of displaced workers remains stable at 
12 per cent. It then increases steeply around 55 and, even more so, around 60, with 28 to 35 
per cent of displaced workers still unemployed. These are also the ages when early retirement 
begins to set in, with a modest proportion of 3 per cent around age 55 and 35 per cent around 
age 60 being able to retire early. Figure 3 shows that economic inactivity is of minor 
importance at all ages for our sample of displaced workers, never exceeding 4 per cent.   
 
Figure 3: Employment status two years after mass displacement by age (age at displacement) 
 
N (observations): 786 
Note: age is measured in age bands (age 25 includes 23-27, age 30 includes 28-32, age 35 includes 33-37 etc.). 
 
We estimate a multinomial regression model on the likelihood of different age groups to be 
unemployed rather than employed, inactive or retired. Since our focus lies on the contrast 
between being unemployed and employed, we translate these logistic coefficients into 
predictive margins. A first model only includes, besides age, a dummy variable for pre-
displacement firm and confirms that the reference age of 35 is associated with the lowest 
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unemployment risk in our sample of displaced workers. While age groups in their early 
twenties and thirties are not significantly more likely to be unemployed, displaced workers in 
their forties have unemployment rates that are 7 to 8 percentage points higher than those of 
former colleagues aged 35. However, the real contrast is with ages 55 and 60 where the 
likelihood of being unemployed exceeds that of displaced workers aged 35 by 20 to 30 
percentage points. Adding a set of socio-demographic controls does not reduce the age 
differences in unemployment among displaced workers (see model 2). If anything, the age 
differences become somewhat larger.  
 
Table 2: The likelihood of displaced workers to be unemployed rather than employed two 
years after plant closure (predictive margins of multinomial regression on employment status) 
  (Model 1) (Model 2) 
Age 25  0.07 0.06 
(ref: 35 years)  (0.06) (0.05) 
 30 0.05 0.05 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
 40 0.08* 0.08** 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
 45 0.07* 0.07** 
  (0.04) (0.03) 
 50 0.08** 0.09** 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
 55 0.21*** 0.22*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
 60 0.30*** 0.34*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Socio-demographic controls  No Yes 
N respondents    776 776 
Pseudo R2  0.349 0.423 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
See note below Figure 3. Both models control for pre-displacement firm. Additional controls in model 2 include 
sex, education, occupation and proxy for nationality.  
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We examine again whether age differences in unemployment vary by occupation and contrast 
in Figure 4 the predictive margins by age and occupation. These results show that the 
unemployment risks differ much more between middle-aged and older clerks as well as 
between middle-aged and older blue collar workers than between middle-aged and older 
white-collar employees. In other words, the unemployment rates for ages 55 and 60 relative to 
35 are much higher among clerks and blue-collar workers than among white-collar 
employees, the difference in the age reaching 8 percentage points at age 55 and 12 to 15 
points at age 60. In our sample of displaced workers, upper-level white-collar employees are 
clearly better insulated against long-term unemployment when they reach their mid-fifties 
than clerks and blue-collar workers. 
 
Figure 4: difference in the likelihood to be unemployed between occupational groups for a 
given age (contrast of predictive margins, 95% confidence intervals) 
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N (observations): 786 
Note: age is measured in age bands (age 25 includes 23-27, age 30 includes 28-32, age 35 includes 33-37 etc.). 
White collar occupations include managers, professionals and technicians (ISCO1, 2, 3) and blue collar occupations 
craft workers, machine operators and elementary occupations (ISCO7, 8, 9).  
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6.3 Variation of wages across age groups 
In a last set of analyses, we integrate information on wages in order to test the expectation that 
older workers are considered too costly. We first look at the factorial survey and the wages 
that recruiters indicated for each profile if a given candidate were to be employed full-time. 
Figure 5 shows that the wage deemed adequate for a profile increases with age. Older 
candidates receive wage recommendations that exceed those of candidates aged 35 by 1.8 
percent at age 40, 2.6 percent at 45, 4.3 percent at 50 and 4.5 percent at 55. Translated into 
annual earnings, this means that for the same productive attributes, workers aged 50 and 55 
are considered to deserve half a monthly wage more per year than workers in their mid-
thirties – with no systematic differences across the three occupations (interaction effects are 
not statistically significant).  
We thus find the seemingly paradoxical result that recruiters value older workers more 
highly in terms of the recommended wage, all the while being less likely to invite them to a 
job interview. This is consistent with our third hypothesis and the argument that older workers 
are sorted out in the hiring process because they are considered too expensive – and they are 
considered too expensive because recruiters expect jobseekers’ going wage to rise with age. 
 
Figure 5: Wage recommendation made by recruiters depending on fictional candidates’ age 
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The graph shows the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of a respondent fixed-effects linear regression on 
the logarithm of the wage recommendations for job candidates by age.   
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We further examine this hypothesis with the mass displacement survey and run a 
regression on change in hourly wages between the pre- and post-displacement job. The 
reference group of workers aged 35 succeeded in maintaining, on average, the same level of 
earnings. Consistent with ascending early careers, younger individuals aged around 25 to 30 
even increased their earnings in the post-displacement job. While workers between ages 40 
and 50 did not have to accept wage cuts, this was the case for older workers. Workers aged 
around 55 and 60 who succeeded to find a new position earned in their post-displacement job 
between 8 (age 55) and 17 percent (age 60) less than in their pre-displacement job. Translated 
in annual earnings, this means that older workers secured a new job at the cost of receiving 
one to two monthly wages less per year. This finding is again consistent with our third 
hypothesis that expected employers to be reluctant to hire older jobseekers – unless these 
latter are willing to make substantial wage sacrifices.  
 
Figure 6: wage difference in post-unemployment relative to pre-unemployment job 
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The graph shows the coefficient and 95% confidence intervals of a linear regression on change in hourly wages 
with controls for sex, education, occupation, proxy for nationality and pre-displacement firm.  
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
Regardless of whether we focus on the factorial survey experiment among recruiters or on the 
natural experiment among displaced workers, we find large age differences in access to jobs 
in the Swiss labour market. In the first research design, older jobseekers do not vary from 
younger jobseekers in their productive attributes and in the second design they were laid off 
by the same exogenous event as their younger colleagues, namely plant closure.  
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In both of these quasi-experimental settings, the likelihood to be invited to a job talk or to 
be reemployed decreases by age. Our analysis thus provides support for the argument of 
heterogeneous age effects of unemployment. The greater vulnerability of older workers to the 
consequences of unemployment is not primarily explained by selection. Both experiments 
suggest that age in and by itself causally affects the chances of finding a job for unemployed 
workers in Switzerland.  
Our reference category of 35 coincides with the highpoint of employability, when workers 
have acquired 10 to 15 years of work experience. There is not much of an age barrier for 
jobseekers in their late forties who do not face very different job prospects than those aged 35. 
The age penalty surfaces around the age of 50 and then becomes sizeable at ages 55 and 60.  
What are the reasons that explain the age penalty in hiring? Our first hypothesis argued that 
employers expect older workers to underperform in tasks requiring physical skills such as 
speed and endurance. As a consequence, the age barrier in hiring should be larger in blue-
collar than white-collar occupations. This expectation is partly borne out by our data. Both 
surveys show a larger age penalty for blue-collar workers than upper-level white-collar 
employees. However, office clerks are not in a better position than blue-collar workers, 
although their job makes lower demands on physical performance than is the case for blue-
collar workers. Older jobseekers may thus struggle to get reemployed in occupations 
dominated by routine tasks more generally.  
Our results allow us to reject our second hypothesis that expected the age penalty to be 
rooted in employers’ concern about promoting internal careers (Daniel and Heywood 2007). If 
this were the case, the age barrier to hiring should be higher among managers and 
professionals than office clerks and blue-collar workers. However, blue-collar workers and 
office clerks suffer larger age penalties than upper-level white-collar employees, even though 
internal labour markets and delayed compensation schemes play a subordinate role in their 
careers. Upper-level white collar employees seem better shielded from age discrimination 
overall: the age penalty sets in later (around 55 rather than 50) and is smaller.  
Finally, our third hypothesis argued that employers expect older workers to cost too much 
relative to their productivity. Therefore, recruiters would hire older jobseekers only if they 
accepted large wage cuts. Our data provide support for the two underlying assumptions of this 
hypothesis. On the demand-side of the labour market, our factorial survey shows that 
recruiters indicate higher reference wages for older than younger jobseekers – even though 
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their productive characteristics do not vary. On the supply-side of the labour market, our data 
suggest that displaced workers in their mid-fifties only find new jobs at the cost of much 
lower wages than what they earned in their pre-displacement job.  
Our results allow us to rule out the internal career thesis as the main mechanism behind the 
age barrier in hiring. However, other explanations than our two hypotheses on physical 
demands and wage costs are also consistent with our findings, notably a taste-based account 
of discrimination. If recruiters hold age-based stereotypes and dislike hiring older workers, 
these latter may need to compensate their disadvantage by offering skills that are in short 
supply, notably long experience and specialized expertise. Where these latter skills are crucial, 
typically in management and the professions, older workers may stand a better chance of 
getting reemployed than in the less specialized positions on the factory floor and in the back 
office. Likewise, our finding that older workers trade in lower wages against the opportunity 
of getting a new job could also be explained with taste-based discrimination. The idea is that 
older workers need to offer large discounts on their wages to be considered attractive 
candidates for a job. 
While our data do not allow us to quantify the role of stereotypes, they throw doubt on 
accounts that primarily emphasize rational decision-making by human resources departments. 
One such account is that older jobseekers are discarded because they have only a limited 
number of years to go until retirement – which makes their recruitment expensive, given the 
fixed costs created by searching, training and job vacancies. Both our surveys show a large 
hiring disadvantage at the age of 55 when workers have another 9 to 10 years to go until 
retirement. Given that median job tenure is less than seven years in Europe (Eurofound 2015: 
17) and less than five years in the United States (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018), rational 
recruiters should consider a horizon of 9 to 10 years as sufficient to recoup investment. This 
should notably be the case in more routine occupations where search costs are lower and 
workers expected to hit the ground running such as in production work, building caretaking or 
the back office. Yet our data show that it is precisely in these occupations that the age 
handicap is largest.  
Finally, our findings raise an uncomfortable question for social policy. Unemployed 
workers in their mid-fifties have a much harder time in the recruitment process than younger 
candidates. Yet, they have a decade more to go until they reach the legal retirement age. The 
prolonged unemployment at the end of people’s careers not only leads to much mental 
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suffering and unhappiness (Lassus et al. 2015), but also points to an unresolved tension in the 
reform of pension systems. As long as employers are reluctant to hire older workers, the 
government summons to work longer sounds hollow to older jobseekers incapable of securing 
new employment.   
 
Notes 
1 The survey was carried out at the University of Lausanne by a team including Fabienne Liechti, Patrick 
McDonald, Flavia Fossati, Daniel Oesch, Giuliano Bonoli and Daniel Auer. 
2 From the combination of all possible vignettes (5,529,600 unique vignettes per occupation), we drew an 
orthogonal (d-efficient) sample of 720 vignettes per occupation (Auspurg and Hinz 2015). We implemented a D-
efficient design that uses an algorithm to minimize inter-correlation among vignette dimensions and interaction 
terms, while maximizing the variance and balance of the frequency of levels.  
3 The survey was carried out at the University of Lausanne by Isabel Baumann and Daniel Oesch. 
4 OECD (2019), Employment rate by age group. doi: 10.1787/084f32c7-en 
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Appendix - Tables 
 
Table A.1: variables included in the vignettes of the factorial survey experiment 
Dimension (variable) Levels (values) 
Gender* Male, female 
Age 35, 40, 45, 50, 55 
Children 0, 1, 2, 3 
Civil Status Single, married, divorced 
Type of education Vocational, general 
Type of work Experience Private sector, public sector 
Nationality*  Swiss, Spanish, Turkish, Polish 
Mother tongue 
German/French 
German/French plus an additional language 
Participation in active labour 
market program** 
None, training program, occupational 
program (matched and unmatched), 
subsidy, temporary employment 
Channel of Application 
Advertisement, referral from current 
employee, unsolicited application, regional 
employment service 
Hobby** 
None, swim coaching, board member of a 
Swiss/foreign cultural association, 
volunteer for Red Cross driving service 
*  These dimensions were denoted by the names of applicants 
**  “None” implies that this dimension did not appear in the vignette. 
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Table A.2: Example of a vignette (translated from French and German) 
You will now be asked to evaluate 12 fictional candidates for 3 different jobs. For each candidate, 
please give the likelihood that you would invite him or her to a job interview (0 = very unlikely, 10 = 
very likely) as well as the monthly salary you would pay them. All the candidates completed their 
compulsory schooling in Switzerland, have been unemployed for 6 months, and lost their previous job 
due to the closure of their firm. 
 
HR assistant job candidate: 
 
Application: One of your employees had recommended Mr Ismail Üstgül for the 
vacant position. 
Personal details: He is 45 years old, has 2 school-aged children and is unmarried. 
 
Education: He has completed upper-secondary vocational education 
 
Professional experience: He has, amongst other work experience, 8 years of Human Resources 
experience in the private sector. 
Language skills: Mr Üstgül speaks French and Turkish. 
 
Hobby: He is a committee member of Türkgücü, a Turkish cultural association. 
 
Further information: He is currently completing training in human resources management, 
paid for by the Regional Employment Office. 
 
 
Invite for an interview: Monthly gross salary (100%): 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ________ CHF 
 
 
Accountant job candidate: 
 
Application: A few days ago, you received a spontaneous application from Ms Nathalie 
Rochat. 
Personal details: She is 40 years old, has one school-aged child, and is divorced. 
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Education: She completed a federal diploma of vocational education and training as a 
commercial employee as well as an advanced federal diploma of higher 
education as chartered expert in financial and managerial accounting  
 
Professional experience: She has, amongst other work experience, 8 years of experience as 
accountant in the public sector.  
 
Language skills: Ms Rochat speaks French 
 
Invite for an interview: Monthly gross salary (100%): 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ________ CHF 
 
Building caretaker job candidate: 
 
Application: The Regional Unemployment Office has sent you the application of Mr 
Pedro Martinez. 
 
Personal details: He is 45 years old, has no children and is married. 
 
Education: He completed an apprenticeship as a commercial building maintenance 
specialist. 
 
Professional experience: He has, amongst other work experience, 8 years of building 
maintenance experience in the private sector. 
 
Language skills: Mr Martinez speaks German and Spanish. 
 
Hobby: In his free time, he volunteers as a driver for the Red Cross. 
 
Further information: Alongside his job search, he has a part-time job as a sales assistant in a 
retail business. 
 
Invite for an interview: Monthly gross salary (100%): 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ________ CHF 
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Table A.3: correlations between vignette dimensions (Cramer’s V)  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 ALMP 1           
2 Channel of applic. 0.028 1          
3 Gender 0.015 0.02 1         
4 Age 0.023 0.017 0.018 1        
5 Children 0.017 0.017 0.034 0.024 1       
6 Civil status 0.028 0.01 0.015 0.036 0.011 1      
7 Hobby 0.029 0.027 0.015 0.024 0.021 0.011 1     
8 Education 0.019 0.021 0.003 0.017 0.009 0.017 0.007 1    
9 Nationality 0.02 0.016 0.013 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.027 0.025 1   
10 Experience 0.013 0.016 0.003 0.014 0.019 0.014 0.015 0 0.013 1  
11 Language 0.022 0.015 0.001 0.009 0.018 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.014 0.018 1 
No correlation is statistically significant at p<0.10 
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Table A.4: Mass displacement survey - descriptive statistics of the variables used 
 min max mean 
Employment status    
Gainfully employed 0 1 0.73 
Unemployed 0 1 0.18 
Early retired 0 1 0.07 
Economically inactive 0 1 0.02 
Change in post- relative to pre-
unemployment wage -0.63 0.67 -0.04 
Age at moment of displacement 23 62 46.72 
25 (22-27) 0 1 0.06 
30 (28-32) 0 1 0.07 
35 (33-37) 0 1 0.08 
40 (38-42) 0 1 0.12 
45 (43-47) 0 1 0.16 
50 (48-52) 0 1 0.19 
55 (53-57) 0 1 0.13 
60 (58-62) 0 1 0.20 
Male 0 1 0.83 
Nationality (proxy)    
Swiss, German, French 0 1 0.70 
Italy 0 1 0.08 
Spain, Portugal 0 1 0.03 
Other 0 1 0.18 
Education    
Does not know  0 1 0.03 
Compulsory education  0 1 0.14 
Pre-apprenticeship 0 1 0.03 
Upper secondary education 0 1 0.54 
Higher vocational education  0 1 0.15 
University 0 1 0.11 
Occupation (isco-1digit)    
Managers (isco1) 0 1 0.09 
Professionals (isco2) 0 1 0.05 
Technicians and associate 
professionals (isco3) 0 1 0.20 
Clerks (isco4) 0 1 0.08 
Craft workers (isco7) 0 1 0.26 
Plant operators (isco8) 0 1 0.29 
Elementary occupations (isco9) 0 1 0.04 
Mass displacement survey 2011. N observations: 776  
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Appendix – Figures 
 
Figure A.1: difference in likelihood to get invited to an interview between occupations for a 
given age (contrast of predictive margins, 95% confidence intervals) 
-. 5
0
.5
1
Li
ke
lih
oo
d  
to
 g
et
 in
vi
te
d  
to
 a
 jo
b 
in
t e
rv
ie
w
40 45 50 55
Age (reference: 35)
Accountant (vs HR) Caretaker (vs HR)
 
